Abstract:Mark Alfano’s book Character As Moral Fiction presents a clear and precise reflection on the situationist view promoted by Gilbert Harman and John Doris, and three of, what he claims to be, virtue ethic’s failed responses to their critique. After a brief overview of virtue ethics, situationism, and their current debate, this paper will argue that Mark Alfano’s objections to one of the responses to situationism, the “dodge,” are insufficient, and thus virtue ethics in its traditional form survives. Once it is shown that the evidence from situationism does not in fact disprove virtue ethics, ideas for ways forward will be proposed since if virtue ethics need not fear situationism, then it ought to embrace potential benefits from its findings.
 Alfano, Mark. Character As Moral Fiction. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
(a PDF can also be found in the Academic Section).